The Nation in the Thoughts of Antun Sa’adeh and Ernest Renan

 

Nizar Fadel Othman

 

 

The concept of the “nation” holds a significant place in social thought and has been the subject of extensive research and debate among philosophers, sociologists, and theorists over the centuries. This concept has spurred a broad and rich intellectual movement, focusing primarily on its role in defining identity and enhancing belonging.

Scholars exploring the topic of “nation” are apt to encounter various approaches, definitions, and differing objectives. This essay does not aim to discuss the difference between the concepts of nation and nationalism, or between the nation and the state — a political entity that may not necessarily align with the existence of a nation. Nor does it seek to historicize the concept of the nation or trace its emergence and evolution. Instead, it addresses the definitions provided by Antun Sa’adeh and Ernest Renan, two prominent thinkers who have made significant contributions to this subject and enriched human cultural heritage with their detailed discussions.

Exploring the contributions of these two men requires a discussion of their roles in shaping human thought. Antun Sa’adeh initiated the Syrian Social Nationalist Renaissance, representing the first organized national, intellectual, ideological, revolutionary movement in the East. His efforts aimed to save the nation from fragmentation, defeat, colonialism, and occupation. Sa’adeh's brilliance, intellectual foresight, and sacrifices—culminating in his martyrdom for his beliefs—have made him an icon of knowledge, action, and selflessness. It is no exaggeration to say that the nation was central to his life’s work.

Ernest Renan was a French thinker and orientalist who died in 1892. Born in Tréguier, he initially studied for the priesthood but soon dedicated himself to philosophy, obtaining his doctorate with a dissertation on “Ibn Rushd and Averroism.” Renan’s travels to Palestine and Lebanon and his lectures at the Sorbonne on Islam highlighted his scholarship in Semitic languages and German philosophy. His discussion of the concept of nation came through a lecture at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882, considered one of the fundamental texts in European nationalist thought at that time. Sa’adeh frequently referenced Renan’s work, describing him as “one of the great scholars and thinkers.” In one notable speech at an event for the Palestinian Club in Beirut in 1933, Sa’adeh cited Renan’s definition: “The nation is born from the marriage of a group of people on a specific spot on Earth,” emphasizing that a nation arises from shared life and land rather than specific origins.

In his introduction to the nation concept in The Rise of Nations, Antun Sa’adeh emphasizes the practical necessity of defining the nation not as an intellectual curiosity or as a philosophical debate with no real impact. His definition serves two primary purposes: affirming identity and concentrating sovereignty on theoretical foundations, which he expressed by saying, “Every nation feels the necessity of exercising sovereignty over itself.” The second purpose is defensive, protecting the nation's interests from the injustices and aggressions of other nations by fortifying them with material and spiritual constructs, whether real or imagined.

Sa’adeh also examined how theorists and thinkers develop their nation's morale, stating that they may seek historical truths or examples, both real or imagined, to bolster their theories. He provides a comprehensive presentation of how the concept of the nation has evolved in various theories through research and investigation. He excludes race as a determinant of a nation, stating: “What the majority of scholars agree upon is that racial unity is an imaginary matter that cannot be accepted scientifically. The nation is not a racial entity but a conventional, rational one formed over time by thought, feeling, and human will.”

He also dismisses customs and traditions as factors in the emergence of a nation, referring to them as societal outcomes without causal roles. Language, although seen as necessary for completing spiritual unity, is considered a means of communication rather than a cause of national formation. Sa’adeh argues that while those forming one nation tend to speak one language, having a common language is not essential for national formation.

Regarding religion, Sa’adeh notes differing views among theorists but ultimately excludes it from the determinants of a nation.

Sa’adeh chose to exclude religion from the determinants of the nation, providing several reasons:

 

1. "Religion is not primarily nationalistic; rather, it negates the principle of nationalism because it has a universal character."

  

2. "Religion does not deviate from the rules of human affairs or the needs of different or similar types of human life. Whenever societal, state, or national interests conflict with religious interests, society's interest must prevail."

  

3. "While religion is singular, nations are numerous. In interactions between nations, each clings to its own beliefs—whether religious or non-religious—to preserve its spiritual independence and avoid submission to another nation's religious authority."

 

Sa’adeh evaluates religion rationally, describing it as "a type of philosophy explaining the universe's manifestations and predicting the fate of the human soul." He concludes that the religious league aimed to prevent the rise of nations, but nations adapted religion to fit their national tendencies. Thus, according to Sa’adeh's definition, religion can be "an element of nationalism" as long as it does not conflict with national unity and spirit.

Regarding political unity, Sa’adeh sees it as "the crown with which a nation coronet itself," thereby gaining recognition from other nations for its right to exist and maintain dignity. However, he does not view political unity as a foundational element but rather as essential for giving the nation's socio-economic entity value.

It is important to note that customs, traditions, language, and religion are not definitive determinants of a nation but play a crucial role in unifying it.

After a brief presentation of the key determinants of the nation, most of which Sa’adeh excluded, we reach a topic crucial to defining the nation from Sa’adeh’s perspective—the single geographical region or environment. This focus has been a point of consideration and response for many who have studied and analyzed Sa’adeh’s thought. Some argued that Sa’adeh considered geography as a primary, influential factor in the emergence of nations, with other factors being secondary. Others accused him of exaggerating the role of geography. However, Sa’adeh does not acknowledge geography as the sole influence on nation-building. It would be inaccurate to claim that his approach to the concept of the nation is limited to geography alone. For Sa’adeh, a nation is what he describes as “community.” He states, “The nation is the most complete community,” defining it as a group of people living together within a specific geographical area, sharing common characteristics and interests.

Sa’adeh emphasizes that geography cannot be overlooked as it plays a vital role in shaping collective identities. Land is fundamental to human existence and influences the development of collective personalities. The relationship between man and earth is crucial, as described by Sa’adeh: “The earth adapts man, and he in turn reacts and adapts it.” This mutual adaptation highlights man’s superiority over other species in the struggle for survival. While humans adapt their needs to suit their environment, they also modify their environment to meet their vital needs. Thus, while geography is essential in shaping group identities, it is not sufficient alone; psychological and cultural ties also play significant roles.

Regarding history, interpretations must consider the interaction between the environment and the group. Environments possess characteristics that distinguish them from others, just as groups have unique psychological traits. Sa’adeh notes: “Nature and geography constitute the inner layer in the history of man's life. For although they clearly differentiate the group, they do not, within the context of group history, provide necessities except rarely and in exceptional cases. Instead, they provide potentialities.” In other words, while Earth’s nature is crucial for historical evolution, psychological and individual factors are equally important in determining human development.

We finally arrive at the socio-economic cycle. As Sa’adeh stated: “The nation has its base, before everything else, in a specific territorial unit with which a group of people interact and within which they interlink and unite. When the nation is formed and becomes conscious of its personality acquired from its climate, food ingredients, settlement, and particular social life, thereby acquiring national immunity, it is capable of completing or modifying its natural boundaries according to its degree of vitality and the extent of its resources and potentialities.” He also emphasized: “To be natural, society must submit to unity of life and social conscience. This means that it must be the scene of one life with one socio-economic cycle comprising the entire group and awakening its social conscience (i.e. a feeling of unity of life and unity of destiny, a feeling that forms social personality with its interests, will, and rights).”

In his lecture “What is a Nation?”, Ernest Renan divides his speech into three sections after an introduction. In the first section, he presents historical facts related to nation-building. The second section addresses various opinions on the factors that establish a nation. In the third section, Renan articulates his own views on the concept of a nation.

In his introduction, Renan categorizes human societies as follows:

 

1- Large human settlements like China, Egypt, and ancient Babylon.

 

2- Tribes such as those among Arabs and Hebrews.

 

3- City-states like Athens and Sparta.

 

4- Federations like the Achaemenid Empire and the Roman Empire.

 

5- Groups living without a homeland but united by religion, such as the Jews.

 

6- Nations like France and England along with several other European entities.

 

7- Federal unions like Switzerland and America.

 

8- Kinship or racial and linguistic affiliations among Germans.

 

Renan notes that the concept of a nation is relatively modern in history. In ancient times, large human congregations such as in Egypt or China were led akin to flocks by divine rulers. He contrasts this with small independent city-states like Athens or Sparta where national spirit was prominent. He discusses groups of people lacking central institutions or ruling dynasties—such as those in Gaul, Spain, and Italy before Roman unification—and empires like Persia or Alexander's Empire which were not nations despite significant achievements in civilization. According to Renan, even though empires like Rome ultimately became synonymous with order, peace, and civilization fostering a sentiment of "Roman peace" among refined souls, they cannot be classified as nations.'''

Then he explains that "it was the Germanic invasions which introduced in the world the principle that, later on, would come to serve as the basis for the existence of nationalities." He argues that the major invasions led by the Germanic peoples induced slight changes in racial composition but imposed dynasties and a military aristocracy on parts of the ancient Western empire. He attributes the names of France, Burgundy, Lombardy, and Normandy to their invaders. Additionally, he credits the Treaty of Verdun with France, Germany, Italy, and Spain's progress toward becoming complete national entities, stating: "The Treaty of Verdun traced divisions that were in principle immutable. From that point on, France, Germany, England, Italy, and Spain were to travel, by frequent detours and across a thousand adventures, towards the full national existence we

today see blossoming."

This raises the question: “What are the distinguishing characteristics of these different countries?” He finds the answer in the fusion of their settled populations. This is due to two main factors: The first is the fact that the Germanic peoples adopted Christianity as soon as they had some extended contact with Greek and Latin peoples,” meaning religious distinction could not occur when the majority embraced the religion of the defeated. The second circumstance is the fact that the “conquerors forgot their own language.”

He continued narratively: “espite the extreme violence of the German invaders’ mores, the mold that they imposed over the century es became the mold of the nation itself.” He emphasized that “Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is an essential factor in the creation of a nation.” Historical studies pose a threat to nationality by highlighting violence during early political formations since unity begins crudely. For instance, “The reunion of northern and southern France was the result of a campaign of terror and extermination that continued for nearly a century.” Thus, forgetting becomes vital for national unity. Without it, the nation’s cohesion is threatened due to initial violence.

Renan added: “The essence of a nation is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgund, an Alain, a Taifala, or a Visigoth. Every French citizen has forgotten St. Bartholomew’s Day and the thirteenth-century massacres in the Midi.” The modern nation is therefore “the historical result of a number of facts that have converged in the same direction,” including:

 

1. Unity achieved by a ruling dynasty (as in France).

2. Unity achieved by regional collective will (as in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium).

3. Unity achieved through public spirit overcoming feudalism (as in Italy and Germany).

 

Renan noted that defeat empowers national unity while victory without adherence to nationhood leads to dispersal. Examples include Italy’s unification via its defeats versus Turkey’s collapse due to its victories. Italy's unity stems from being a nation; Turkey outside Asia Minor is not a nation.

Renan poses several questions: "What is a nation? Why is the Netherlands considered a nation but not Hanover or the Grand Duchess of Parma? How does France remain a nation when the principle that formed it has vanished? How can Switzerland be a nation with three languages, two religions, and multiple races, while homogeneous Tuscany is not? Why is Austria a country but not a nation? How does the principle of nationalities differ from that of races?"

He begins by discussing political theorists' opinions, where they believe a nation is mainly a ruling dynasty representing an ancient conquest, initially accepted and later forgotten by most people. While noting that many modern nations emerged from feudal families centralizing power, Renan rejects the idea that dynasties sustain nations. He cites America and Switzerland as nations formed without dynastic bases and concludes that nations can separate from their ruling dynasties without ceasing to exist.

On race, Renan acknowledges its role in ancient tribes and cities as extensions of families. However, he distinguishes between peoples such as Arabs, Jews, ancient Spartans, and empires like Rome, which continued through shared interests rather than pure race. He asserts that there are no pure races; the most noble countries like England, France, and Italy have highly mixed populations. Germany is not an exception—it's an illusion to consider it purely Germanic.

Regarding language, Renan argues it fosters unity but does not compel it. For instance, the shared language in the USA and Britain or Latin America and Spain did not create single nations. He emphasizes the importance of collective will over linguistic unity, citing Switzerland's unity despite its linguistic diversity.

As for religion, Renan doesn't see it as forming a nation. Lastly, he considers participation in shared interests a strong bond among people but insufficient to build a nation on its own.

Geography or natural borders: Geography plays a significant role in dividing nations. It is one of the fundamental elements of history. Rivers have facilitated the movement of races, while mountains have impeded them. Rivers encourage historical movements, whereas mountains limit them. However, can we claim, as some do, that national borders are etched on maps and that nations have the right to expand to natural borders like mountains or rivers? This belief, in my opinion, is both arbitrary and dangerous as it justifies acts of violence. We must first question whether mountains or rivers truly constitute natural borders. What is clear and indisputable is that mountains separate while rivers unite. Moreover, not all mountains are suitable for defining national borders.

It is not the land that creates a nation more than race does. The land provides the material space for struggle and work, but humans provide the spirit. Humans are the foundation of what we call 'the people.' Matter alone is insufficient; a nation is a spiritual principle emerging from the complexities of history—a spiritual family rather than a land-defined group.

Renan defines a nation as " a body and soul at the same time" composed of two key elements: one rooted in the past and one in the present. The past consists of a shared heritage of memories; the present involves harmony and the desire to live together and elevate the nation's status. He remarks that a nation embodies great solidarity formed from past sacrifices and the willingness to make future sacrifices. A nation requires a historical existence but manifests in present unity—the conscious commitment to continue communal life. Renan likens this to a daily poetic referendum affirming life.

The purpose of this comparative study is not to criticize Sa’adeh's or Renan's concepts of "nation," but to reconcile their ideas, discuss their differences, and sculpt an optimal definition of "nation."

Examining their concepts reveals multiple points of convergence between Sa’adeh and Renan. Both excluded race, lineage, language, religion, and other factors as defining characteristics while acknowledging their importance for national continuity. Geography emerges as a primary point of difference: Sa’adeh emphasized its necessity while Renan acknowledged its influence but denied its definitive role. Lastly, they wrestled with whether participation in an interest group or defining the nation as "a united entity" or "a spiritual principle" was paramount.

Renan’s perspective on the geographical factor can be summarized as follows:

 

1. The geographical factor can justify aggression by one nation against another to expand its borders.

 

2. “The land provides matter, the field of struggle and work, but man provides the spirit. Man is the entire basis for the formation of what we call the people. The material thing, no matter how important, is not enough for that.”

 

Renan appears to confuse the concepts of “nation” and “state,” or what Sa’adeh calls “natural society” and “artificial society.” An artificial society may encompass multiple natural societies. For example, during the Islamic State, natural Syria and Arab countries formed an artificial society without eliminating their inherent differences, many of which stem from geographical factors. Thus, the geographical factor shapes natural society but does not necessarily incite violence or territorial expansion. Such expansion often reflects certain groups’ ambitions rather than altering a nation’s nature or borders as long as its people inhabit it.

Renan also suggests that defeat can strengthen a nation by uniting it, while victory can diminish the cohesion of a non-nation group. He exemplifies this with Italy and Turkey: Italy unified through defeats while Turkey collapsed despite victories because Italy is a nation whereas Turkey beyond Asia Minor is not.

Another notable point in Renan’s statement is that many modern nations were established by feudal families who “ontracted with the soil and in some measure formed the nucleus of central government.” Here, Renan implies that a nation’s creation necessitates a union between community and land.

Addressing Renan's phrase “Geography provides the substratum, the field of battle and of work but man provides the soul,” we question where man’s spirit stands without matter or the field of battle. Sa’adeh echoes this sentiment: “The nation has its base, before everything else, in a specific territorial unit with which a group of people interact and within which they interlink and unite.” Therefore, while Sa’adeh agrees with Renan with respect to Turkey and Italy, he disagrees with Renan’s broader doctrine regarding the geographical factor.

As for “participation in a group of interests,” it can be viewed from both narrow and broad perspectives. The narrow perspective is represented by commercial treaties, while the broad perspective encompasses socio-economic interaction. Renan dismisses this factor in the founding of a nation. He states elsewhere: “The essence of a nation is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common.” This raises the question: Isn’t the socio-economic factor one of these common elements, and isn’t it fundamental to participation? Furthermore, if we accept his definition of the nation as “the will to live together,” how can participation be achieved if we overlook the socio-economic factor? Sa’adeh summarizes this well: “For a society to be natural, it must be unified in life and social conscience, meaning there must be a shared socio-economic cycle that encompasses the entire group and nurtures a sense of unity and common destiny.”

In conclusion, when Renan defines a nation as “the will to common life,” he implies that it is made up of people with a shared desire for communal living. However, will alone, despite its significance, is not stable; it is one of the most variable aspects influenced by changing circumstances. Renan also suggests that forgetting is crucial for nation-building and asserts that unity often results from coercion and violence. He provides examples from European history where nations formed through invasions and massacres. This prompts us to ask: If unity stems from coercion and violence, can the will to common life truly be considered the primary defining factor of a nation?

Renan contends that forgetting—and even historical inaccuracies — is essential for creating a nation. For instance, France unified after numerous massacres, necessitating that people forget these atrocities to achieve national unity. He warns against historical studies lighting upon past massacres since such studies could undermine national unity by evoking divisive sentiments. This poses another question: How solid is a nation’s unity if it is threatened by historical scrutiny? Furthermore, isn't there an element of arbitrariness toward science when historical studies are deemed dangerous simply for revealing truths that might instill division? In this context, can an entity with such characteristics truly embody the concept of a nation? Additionally, isn’t there a contradiction in Renan’s assertion that two elements—one arising from past collective memories and another requiring forgetting—constitute the essence of a nation?