The State of the Nation[1]

 

 

Today, the entire Social National movement feels the pain of the devastating blow Great Britain dealt to Syria on this day in 1917. However, our great movement does not wallow in pain. Instead, it gains a deeper understanding of its cause and strengthens its commitment to its ideals, increasing its faith in both the central leadership and the future. Like a brave and formidable force, the Social National movement looks upon the universe, pondering the atmosphere and challenges it faces while preparing itself for a momentous task: changing the course of history.

On this day, we also remember with deep sorrow that the Balfour Declaration was neither the first nor the last blow struck against Syria in the twentieth century. One blow preceded it, and many followed. The initial blow occurred when Great Britain, France, and Russia secretly agreed before World War I to divide Syria into spheres of influence among themselves after retaking it from Turkey. This agreement gave way to the secret Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, allowing Great Britain and France to divide Syria between them upon emerging victorious from the war.

While Syria struggled with reactionary plans to break free from Turkish rule and did everything possible to support the Allies in achieving victory, Great Britain and France considered her part of the "Sick Man of Europe" (a nickname for Turkey) and plotted to divide her among themselves as spoils of war.

In the Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria was divided into two colonies or spheres of influence: Britain took control of Palestine (including East Jordan with ill-defined borders) and Mesopotamia (Iraq), while France took control of al-Sham (including Mount Lebanon). After reaching an agreement in Paris, both nations saw themselves entitled to their respective portions under this agreement. At that time, Syria lacked a clear national cause focused on its identity and rights; thus, it could not resist these bizarre bargains or declare any foreign deal made at its expense null and void.

Based on the Sykes-Picot agreement and prior to the end of the war (before Britain and France had taken actual control of Syria), the British political establishment realized they could sell Palestine to the Jews in exchange for bolstering their position during the war. From this political perception came the idea of reaching an understanding with the Jews through representatives in the Zionist movement. This understanding led to the Balfour Declaration, issued by British Foreign Minister Lord Balfour on November 2, 1917, pledging British support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In summary, this text tells the story of the Balfour Declaration, its background, and its legal basis. The declaration was a hostile act against the Syrian nation's existence, sovereignty, and rights. Syria should have expressed disapproval and challenged the declaration, but it was a mere shell with no soul at that time. Riddled with religious divisions and internal animosities, there was no national consciousness in Syria during the Balfour Declaration era.

The early stirrings of freedom and revival were not rooted in the desire to determine their own destiny but in wanting to return to a bygone state. People had their sights set on Arabdom instead of focusing on their own nation. Hopes for salvation were placed outside their country, with no attempt to establish a Syrian army for liberation. The division of people into religious political factions made the idea of an army seem unattainable.

The mindset was simple: since Syria is an "Arab country," its nucleus and point of reference should be Arabdom. Thus, its destiny should be placed in their hands, turning to them for guidance.

 

The Ramifications of the Balfour Declaration

During World War I, France and Great Britain sought support from various nations and peoples, making enticing promises of independence to the Syrians. However, these commitments were never documented. Without a national movement, no one pursued negotiations or formalized agreements like the Balfour Declaration.

In contrast, Egyptians and Arabs maintained control over their individual causes. They did not rely on others to assert their rights or manage their affairs. While there existed separate Egyptian and Arab causes, a distinct Syrian cause was absent. Consequently, neither British nor French authorities felt compelled to negotiate directly with Syrians during the 1914-1918 war.

After agreements between Great Britain and Egypt over Egypt's independence and Britain's deal with Jews for a National Home in Palestine, the focus shifted to forging a deal with the Arabs. Sherif Hussein of Mecca, chief ruler of Najd, and Ibn Saud were engaged in these negotiations. Hussein held close connections with Syrians who fervently supported him due to their lack of a national cause. Consequently, he envisioned an empire for himself and his descendants, where his sons would reign as kings over various territories, including parts of Syria. Some politically active Syrians even backed him.

As a result, Syria continued without an independent national cause or any influence in decision-making processes. They missed out on a significant opportunity for establishing independence that few nations have ever experienced.

 

Persistence of Syrian Paralysis

Prior to World War I, Syrians failed to establish a national cause or capitalize on the war to create an independent state. Consequently, without a cause or state, they adhered to outdated principles influenced by foreign interests. Even after the war, Syria's destiny remained dictated by external powers. At the war's end, Syria fell under British and French control in 1918. Circumstances worsened due to the misrepresentation of their national cause at the Peace Conference, where Jewish claims took precedence and significantly impacted Syria's rights, unity, and future. Following President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the League of Nations transformed French-British colonization into a "Mandate," dividing control between Britain and France.

In 1919, at fifteen years old and amidst ongoing political discussions, I met prominent figures from Beirut who sought my opinion on whether British or French occupation would be preferable. Confidently, I expressed that they were misguided, arguing that our nation must take control of its destiny—an idea leaving them speechless.

Sadly, few people understood the weight of these circumstances. The voices of writers warning against imminent dangers went unheard due to widespread confusion within society; local issues and religious partisanship overshadowed national insightfulness.

During Faisal's brief rule from 1919 to 1920, tensions arose between the Shamis and Iraqis—intensified by minor disagreements and religious divisions. Uniting them under one banner proved difficult as loyalties were rooted in sectarian rather than national identity. Similarly, across Lebanon, Palestine, and Alawi areas of al-Sham, various religious factions held strong influence—hindering cohesion and cooperation on a national level.

 

The Rise of the Turks and Loss of Cilicia

In 1918, the British-French occupation succeeded the Turkish occupation in Syria. At this time, spiritual fragmentation and national disintegration were rampant, allowing the British and French to consolidate their power and implement their colonial plans. Political resistance to colonization was specific in origin and objectives, whether religious, clannish, or provincial. Various groups across the country had narrow agendas tailored to local constituents, with foreign powers encouraging this fragmentation.

As a result, several distinct causes emerged within the nation: Iraqis advocated for an exclusive Iraqi cause; Shamis for a "Byzantine" Syrian cause with limited appeal; Christians in Lebanon pursued a "Lebanese" cause; Alawites of Wadi al-Nasara championed an Alawite cause; Druzes of Huran promoted a Druze cause; while local Palestinian and Transjordanian causes also surfaced. Amidst these petty disputes, a resurgent Turkey prepared for a major comeback after their recent defeat in the war. Ataturk swiftly implemented reforms and turned his attention to the fertile Syrian territory of Cilicia.

He exploited the political vacuum in Syria and relied on his people's unity to overcome any shortcomings. Soon after, the French ceded Cilicia to the Turks. Thus, preoccupied with local problems rather than focusing on combating foreign powers, Syria lost one of its wealthiest provinces.

 

Persistence of Confusion and Retrogression

Despite the major catastrophes mentioned, Syria remained powerless against foreign forces and outside ambitions, as all politically dominant groups were reactionary in nature. These groups, either religious, feudal, or clannish, operated like businesses with limited resources and strict stakeholders. Each group created a private firm to control and monopolize national issues. Consequently, firms emerged in every Syrian sector, sometimes even two in one area, each controlling a specific domain.

This led to the delineation of issues in Mesopotamia, al-Sham, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan and subsequently resulted in fragmented political efforts. There was no central cause to unify these areas under a single plan of action; each group focused solely on its territory and disregarded anything beyond it. The nation's forces splintered as each part addressed its local concerns independently. Consequently, there was no unifying framework to face major threats.

Syria lost Cilicia without significant resistance, barely affecting other regions of the nation. Even when the danger in Palestine escalated, not all regions sensed it accurately. The threat to Alexandretta in the north also increased without altering the national situation. This stemmed from the fact that political affairs in Palestine were regionally restricted and monopolized by local political elites; whereas, in al-Sham, they were confined almost exclusively to local inhabitants. This localized focus led them to overlook events elsewhere in Syria.

 

The Stumbling in the National Question of Palestine

During the First World War, Syria lacked a national revival program, leaving it vulnerable to external threats and unable to tap into its abundant resources. The country paid a high price for its disintegration and fragmentation, losing Cilicia, Palestine, and Alexandretta.

In Palestine, the political class operated on a non-national basis, using vague Arab concepts instead of Syrian terms of reference—such as Syrian nation, homeland, and shared destiny—making it difficult to defend their authentic rights. Their claims were based on the Arab conquest of Palestine and Britain's promise to Sherif Hussein during WWI, rather than legitimate Syrian rights in the region. This allowed Arab states to encroach upon Syrian national sovereignty.

The mishandling of the Palestinian issue placed genuine Syrian claims on equal footing with those of foreign Jews while tracing Syrian rights back to dubious Arab conquerors. This flawed logic would also justify Turkish or British entitlements to Palestine due to their historical conquests. Consequently, the right to determine the fate of Palestine could be granted to any invading power.

Regarding the Balfour Declaration, objections were raised on political grounds—not legal ones—arguing that it breached Britain's promise to Hussein instead of violating fundamental rights. This protest implies that without Britain's promise or the Arab conquest of Syria, Syrians and Palestinians would have no inherent stake in Palestine.

 

Ineffective Principles

Thus, the principles of national work in Palestine and throughout Syria were fraudulent, as they neither guaranteed the Syrian nation its rights nor facilitated revival and triumph over adversaries. Long ago, I recognized the inadequacy of these principles and concluded that our nation could only rise through sound foundations. In such principles, Syria could rediscover its rights, interests, and pathways to progress and eminence. I also recognized the ineffectiveness of local policies and tactics in Palestine. My assessment revealed that attempting to separate the Palestinian issue from broader Syrian questions was futile. Likewise, detaching it from Syria's jurisdiction to turn it into an issue for every Arab state was equally fruitless.

Consequently, I was determined to rectify this problem and establish the right framework for both the Palestinian issue and other challenges facing Syria. In 1924, I analyzed the Palestinian issue and its political and legal basis in an article published in Sao Paulo-based newspaper al-Majallah. Later, in 1931, I replied to a speech by veteran British politician Lloyd George, who supported Jewish claims in Palestine. I argued that the Palestinian issue was a matter for the entire Syrian nation, with its population holding authentic and legal rights in Palestine.

In 1932, during our party's formation as an underground cell, I gave a speech at the Palestinian Club at the American University of Beirut. In this address, I alerted the nation about impending threats from Turkey on our northern borders and increasing Jewish influence in Palestine. In 1936's "Blue Declaration," I addressed various political issues within Lebanon, al-Sham, and Palestine. Regarding the Balfour Declaration as a political document devoid of legal weight, I maintained that Jews held no rights in Palestine.

To my delight, Faris Khoury reasserted this statement at the Arab Parliamentary Congress in Egypt in 1938. In 1937, I submitted a memorandum on behalf of our party to the League of Nations, responding to the Peel Commission Report's recommendation to divide Palestine into two states. I once again explained the basis of the Palestinian issue from a social-national perspective and asserted that the Syrian nation held sole rights in Palestine, regardless of any British promises made.

The memorandum became a model for other groups which have adopted its format (although without realistic implementation methods). Today, the principles, ideas, and fundamentals I detailed in those letters and articles serve as a philosophical foundation for the Palestinian issue within the Syrian Social National Party, and as a blueprint for continued effort on this front.

 

The Ignominy of Reactionary and Arbitrary Work 

It is with regret that I must say the Syrian political groups working on the Palestine Question employed arbitrary and reactionary methods, neglecting the need for collaboration with our party. Consequently, reckless actions persisted, gambling with the fate of both Palestine and Syria.

The 1936 "uprising" is an example of these reckless methods. Its true motives and conclusion remain known only to God and a few astute observers. Although some claimed it was initiated to combat Jewish influence, it fizzled out just as it began gaining traction in Syria. Ultimately, the "uprising" strengthened Jewish positions at the expense of Syrian lives, finances, and resources. Following this revolt, Jewish militarization and expansion in Palestine escalated dangerously. A 1937 attempt at another uprising failed due to depleted resources and a loss of faith in such reckless endeavors.

I am not focusing on specific individuals; instead, I am evaluating principles and methods and reflecting on the catastrophes caused by reactionary policies not just in Cilicia but also in Palestine, Alexandretta, and Aqaba. The "reactionary renaissance" in Syria has led to disaster after disaster, leaving our homeland vulnerable.

During the early stages of the social national renaissance, which sought to strengthen its foundation and promote its principles and beliefs system, the "reactionary renaissance" fervently pursued private goals, bargaining across all fronts. In Palestine, existing parties continued their efforts until the issue was handed over to the "Arab League," which immediately involved themselves with decision-making processes. Britain, Russia, and the United States picked apart these decisions according to their own interests while Jews quietly worked towards a "Jewish national home" at Syria's expense.

This particularist approach persisted in Palestine (and throughout Syria) despite escalating danger and power plays by larger nations siding with Jews. Unable to devise an effective national strategy yet still demonstrating theatrical defiance -- such as attempting to intimidate Britain by falsely claiming an alliance with Russia -- the methods of this group remained unchanged. Meanwhile, the Jews discretely negotiated deals with the Russians, uniting states that otherwise disagreed, all against our interests in Palestine.

As the Palestine Question entered its final international stage before the United Nations General Assembly, how did self-serving politicians in Syria respond? They continued their reckless approach, leaving the matter to the "Arab League." After the resolution to partition Palestine was decided, these same policymakers called for a "Jihad," provoking individuals with their arbitrary tactics. Instead, they should have issued a call for organized national cooperation to prepare political groups and parties in advance.

The arbitrary and self-interested policy has led the Palestine Question to the same disastrous outcome as Cilicia and Alexandretta. Responsibility for the catastrophe falls squarely on these particularist policies and factional partisanships. Oddly enough, their proponents still seek to involve more people in their endeavor despite their failure.

 

Our Position:

I declare that:

 

1. The Syrian nation alone holds the natural and legal rights to Palestine, and solely possesses the authority to decide its fate.

2. Neither Britain, Russia, nor the United States has the right to determine Palestine's future, nor do Egypt or other Arab nations.

3. The General Assembly of the United Nations lacks authority to impose resolutions infringing on Syria's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

4. The UN General Assembly does not possess the prerogative to dismiss free nations' rights to self-determination.

5. The UN General Assembly is a product of victors in World War II but does not represent a global consensus; it cannot determine Syria's fate or that of southern Palestine.

6. Any international resolution violating Syrian sovereignty or its right to self-determination is invalid; this principle applies to Arab League actions as well, which cannot override Syrian sovereignty or rights.